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Application of the Undue Burden Test to Mass
Transportation: Parallel or Pitfall
Recent estimates indicate that there are approximately 31.5 mil-
lion' physically disabled individuals2 in the United States. Many of
these individuals face significant barriers to their use of mass transpor-
tation3 which inhibit their ability to share equally in employment, edu-
cational, residential, and recreational opportunities.
4
This Comment analyzes federal statutes enacted by Congress to
guarantee equal access to mass transportation to handicapped individ-
uals.5 The Comment also tracks the federal regulations implementing
1. 1983 WORLD ALMANAC 962. Statistics issued by the National Center for Health
Statistics, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, indicate that in 1979 these indi-
viduals were limited in their activity by physical handicaps including arthritis, rheumatism,
heart conditions, hypertension not related to heart problems, diabetes, asthma, impairments
of the back and spine, impairments of the lower extremity or hip, and visual and hearing
impairments. Based on unpublished data from the NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY,
NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, NINTH REVISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES. The
report also indicated that approximately 8.1 million individuals were unable to carry on any
major activity whatever. Id.
2. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(i) (1981), a regulation promulgated under title 45 and relating to
public welfare, defines physical or mental impairment as: "(A) any physiological disorder or
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following
body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory including
speech organs; cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic;
skin; and endocrine; or (B) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation,
organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities."
3. The federal statute governing mass transportation for the disabled is 49 U.S.C.
§ 1612 (Supp. IV 1980).
4. President Nixon, in urging action to guarantee disabled and elderly persons equal
access to public transportation, noted: "Isolated from regular contact with society, many of
our handicapped citizens lead lives of lonely frustration. Working together, on both private
and public levels we can-and must-insure full lives for them. Together we can topple the
environmental barriers which prevent the handicapped from entering buildings or using
public transportation;. . . and we can bring all of our handicapped fellow citizens into the
mainstream of American Life." Proclamation No. 4001, 6 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1169
(Sept. 8, 1970). Representative Henry C. Reuss, in urging support for the 1970 Urban Mass
Transportation Act, see infra notes 12-20, stated: "While we have done our utmost for auto-
mobile owners and truckers, we have left the poor, the aged, and the handicapped stranded
in our urban centers-stranded by transit systems that if operative at all can take them
neither safely, nor speedily nor economically, to the jobs and assistance they need." 116
CONG. REC. 34174 (1970).
5. Primary emphasis will be placed on § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L.
No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976)), see infra note 28 &
accompanying text; the Urban Mass Transportation Acts (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
[4911
this policy.6 It then analyzes American Public Transit Association v.
Lewis,7 in which the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reversed the district court and held that, despite the congressional man-
date in section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,8 local govern-
ments cannot be forced to make "burdensome modifications" to their
facilities in order to accommodate the handicapped.9 In so holding, the
court of appeals sought to apply the rationale used by the United States
Supreme Court in Southeastern Community College v. Davis,'0 which
upheld the right of a college to bar participation of a deaf applicant in
its nursing program. This Comment contrasts the more recent decision
of Dopico v. Goldschmidt,II which distinguished the Southeastern deci-
sion on its facts and held that handicapped persons have a right of
reasonable access to mass transit systems under the authority of section
504. The Comment concludes that the Lewis decision misapplies the
rationale used by the Court in Southeastern and that section 504, by
itself and in conjunction with other federal statutes, can require local
transit authorities to make reasonable modifications to their mainline
systems in order to accommodate qualified handicapped individuals.
Federal Statutes
Urban Mass Transportation Act
Congress has passed several federal statutes directed at solving the
problem of access to public transportation by the physically handi-
capped. The first was the Urban Mass Transportation Act (UMTA),1
2
passed in 1964 and amended in 1970. The Act provided state and local
governments with federal financial assistance for mass transportation
programs. 13
Notwithstanding this aid, urban transportation systems continued
to deteriorate and public transportation within urban centers became a
§§ 1601-1612 (1976)), see infra note 13 & accompanying text; and the Federal-Aid Highway
Act of 1973, 23 U.S.C. § 142 (1976), see infra note 21 & accompanying text.
6. Primary focus is placed on the "special efforts" requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 613(b)
(1976), see infra note 34 & accompanying text, and on the Department of Transportation
(DOT) regulations requiring "mainstreaming" of the physically handicapped, codified at 49
C.F.R. § 2781 (1981), see infra note 42 & accompanying text.
7. 655 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'g American Pub. Transit Ass'n v. Goldschmidt,
485 F. Supp. 811 (D.D.C. 1980).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973).
9. 655 F.2d 1272, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
10. 442 U.S. 397 (1979). See infra note 67 & accompanying text.
11. 687 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'g in part 518 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
12. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1612 (1976) [hereinafter cited as UMTA].
13. Id. In 1964, Congress passed a $75 million transportation assistance program to
help selected cities preserve their urban transit service by converting failing private compa-
nies to public ownership. Id. Between 1966 and 1969, an additional $600 million was au-
thorized for the program. See id § 1603(b) (1970).
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pressing federal concern. 14 In response, Congress passed the Urban
Mass Transportation Assistance Act in 1970,15 which amended the
UMTA and substantially increased the funds to be appropriated to in-
sure that "all citizens" would be able to move quickly and at a reason-
able cost.16 These 1970 amendments permitted the Secretary of
Transportation to set aside one and one-half percent of funds available
for research, development, and demonstration projects to be used to
increase the information and technology available for planning and de-
signing transit systems accessible to the handicapped.17 Congress also
added section 16 to the UMTA, which states that elderly and handi-
capped persons have the same right as other persons to utilize mass
transportation facilities and services.18 Section 16 authorizes the Secre-
tary of Transportation to make grants and loans to state and local au-
thorities for the purpose of making mass transportation services
accessible to the handicapped. 19
Congress again demonstrated its intent to make transportation ac-
cessible in 1975 when, in appropriating funds to implement UMTA for
that year, it attached a rider to the bill emphasizing that all funds had
to be used to design and purchase accessible transportation modes.
20
The UMTA expresses Congress' intent that recipients of federal trans-
portation assistance take affirmative steps to provide handicapped indi-
viduals with accessible public transportation. 2'
14. See id § 1601(a) (1970).
15. See Pub. L. No. 91-453, 84 Stat. 962 (1970).
16. 49 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1970).
17. Id § 1612(c); see also 116 CONG. REc. 34,180 (1970) (statement of Rep. Biaggi).
18. Section 16 is codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1612 (1970). It states: "It is hereby declared to
be the national policy that elderly and handicapped persons have the same right as other
persons to utilize mass transportation facilities and services; that special efforts shall be
made in the planning and design of mass transportation facilities and services so that the
availability to elderly and handicapped persons of mass transportation which they can effec-
tively utilize will be assured; and that all federal programs offering assistance in the field of
mass transportation (including programs under this Act) should contain provisions imple-
menting this policy."
19. Id.
20. "None of the funds provided under this Act shall be available for the purchase of
passenger rail or subway cars, for the purchase of motor buses or for the construction of
related facilities unless such cars, buses, and facilities are designed to meet the mass trans-
portation needs of the elderly and the handicapped." Department of Transportation and
Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-391, § 315, 88 Stat. 781 (1974).
21. Representative Biaggi, in introducing § 16 of the UMTA, stated: "Other proposals
have been offered that would set up special transportation facilities for the elderly and the
handicapped. Others would provide subsidies for the elderly so that these people could use
more expensive services such as taxicabs or limousines. However, besides the factor of costs
for these programs, they would further serve to segregate the elderly and the handicapped
from our society. This Nation has been insensitive to the needs of those Americans for too
long. I think it is time this Congress saw to it that equal rights to transportation facilities are
extended to these 44 million citizens." 116 CONG. REc. 34,180-81 (1970) (emphasis added).
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Federal-Aid Highway Act
In the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973 (FAHA), 22 Congress ex-
tended its policy of improving mass transportation for all citizens by
allowing the use of highway funds for mass transportation projects.
23
The Senate Report of the 1973 FAHA extends the existing policy of
section 16(A) of the UMTA24 to bus and rail improvements financed
under the Highway Act.
25
In 1975, the FAHA was amended to require that mass transit
projects funded with federal highway funds be constructed and oper-
ated to allow effective utilization by elderly and handicapped persons.
26
The amendment also directed the Secretary of Transportation not to
provide any federal financial assistance to programs or projects that did
not comply with these stated goals.27 The FAHA therefore reflected a
continuing congressional concern with and commitment to integrating
handicapped persons into mainstream transportation systems.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Congress also recognized the rights of the handicapped by passing
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (section 504),28 which pro-
vides that "[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the
Support for accommodating the needs of the handicapped with federal assistance was also
noted in the remarks of Senator Magnuson: "[U]rban mass transit is far more than a re-
sponse to congestion. It serves a population segment-the old, the young, the sick, the hand-
icapped, and the impoverished-which virtually has no other means of travel." Id. at 2255;
see also id. at 34,164 (remarks of Rep. Patman). Long after the House had unanimously
incorporated § 16 into the UMTA, Representative Biaggi, introducing § 315 of the Depart-
ment of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-
391, 88 Stat. 781 (1975), see supra note 20, reaffirmed congressional intent when he noted: "I
am offering this amendment to reaffirm our national policy that elderly and handicapped
persons have the same right as other persons to utilize mass transportation facilities and
services. When this policy was first enunciated in my amendment to the 1970 Urban Mass
Transportation Assistance Act, it [was] hailed as the emancipation proclamation for the
handicapped. . . . I want to see steps in buses eliminated-and they can be. I want to see
escalators and elevators instead of stairways-and they can be put in. I want to see gates
instead of turnstyles--and we can have them. I want to see mass transportationfor all Ameri-
cans-and we can have it." 120 CONG. REc. 19,851 (1974) (emphasis added).
22. Pub. L. No. 93-87, 87 Stat. 250 (1973) [hereinafter cited as FAHA].
23. 23 U.S.C. § 142 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
24. 49 U.S.C. § 1612 (1976). See supra note 18.
25. S. REP. No. 93-61, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1973).
26. Federal-Aid Highway Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-643, § 105, 88 Stat.
2281, 2282 (1975) (codified at 23 U.S.C. § 142 (1976): "It is ... the Committee's intent that
any project receiving funds. . . to the maximum extent feasible, be planned, designed, con-
structed, and operated to provide for effective use by the elderly or handicapped." S. REP.
No. 93-111, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974).
27. Pub. L. No. 93-643, § 105, 88 Stat. at 2282-83.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976), Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 394.
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United States. . .shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance. ' 29 The legislative history and language of section 504 re-
veal Congress' belief that isolation of the handicapped from main-
stream society stemmed from discrimination.30 Transportation was one
area in which this discrimination was evident, and the 1974 amend-
ments to the Act, 3 ' which expanded the definition of "handicapped in-
dividuals" under section 504,32 indicate that section 504 was intended
29. Id. Section 504 was patterned after, and is almost identical to, the antidiscrimina-
tion language of§ 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VI, § 601, 78
Stat. 252 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)(1) (1976)) which states: "[N]o
person in the United States, shall, on the ground of race, color, national origin, handicap,
religion, or sex, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance
... " Id. at 99.
30. The handicapped person "is all too often excluded from schools and educational
programs, barred from employment or is under-employed because of archaic attitudes to-
ward the handicapped, denied access to transportation, buildings and housing because of
architectural barriers and lack of planning, and is discriminated against by our public laws."
S. REP. No. 319, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973).
31. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38 reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6373; see Pub. L. No. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617 (1974). The amendments were designed to
bring about maximum participation by individuals with handicaps in the assessment, plan-
ning, and implementation of a White House Conference on the Handicapped and in the
development of recommendations for administrative action and legislation to be presented
to the President and the Congress. Id. The Rehabilitation Act was again later amended by
the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services and Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978.
Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955 (1978). This latter amendment pertained to the award of
attorneys' fees under § 503 for federal contractors' failure to advance in employment quali-
fied handicapped individuals. See 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (Supp. III 1979).
32. Commenting on these amendments, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare stated: "Section 504 was enacted to prevent discrimination against all handicapped
individuals, regardless of their need for, or ability to benefit from, vocational rehabilitation
services, in relation to employment, housing, transportation, education, health services, or
any other federally-aided programs." Id. (emphasis added). After § 504 was enacted, the
question arose whether the statute provided an implied private right of action. In several of
the early suits by handicapped persons against transit systems, some courts held it would be
unreasonable to require accessibility to buses when the necessary technology was not avail-
able. See, e.g., United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 409 F. Supp. 1297, 1300-02 (D. Minn.
1976), remanded, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977) (appeals court requiring good faith efforts at
modifications within a reasonable time); Webb v. Miami Valley Regional Transit Auth., No.
C-3-75-67, slip op. (S.D. Ohio Jan. 8, 1976); Bohlke v. Golden Gate Bridge Highway &
Transp. Dist., No. 73662, slip op. (Superior Court, Marin County, Cal., May 8, 1975). How-
ever, in Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977), the court of appeals
vacated and remanded a district court ruling and held that § 504 created affirmative rights
and that a private cause of action could be implied to enforce those rights. Id. at 1281. Even
when courts concluded that handicapped persons could not compel bus accessibility, plain-
tiffs were allowed to block purchases of buses until it could be demonstrated that the statu-
tory regulations were being followed. See, e.g., United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 409 F.
Supp. at 1300. Later, when manufacturers offered optional wheelchair accessibility features,
to address discriminatory practices against the physically handicapped
in mass transportation and other areas.
Federal Regulations: "Special Efforts" v. Concept of
Mainstreaming
In 1976, the Department of Transportation (DOT) issued regula-
tions designed to implement section 504, section 16 of the UMTA, and
section 165(b) of the FAHA.33 The 1976 DOT regulations required that
state and local planners make "special efforts" to plan public mass
transportation facilities and services that can effectively be utilized by
elderly and handicapped persons. 34 Approval of federal project grants
was conditioned on these special efforts.
35
The special efforts regulations were accompanied by guidelines il-
lustrating the kinds of plans that would satisfy the requirements. The
guidelines allowed each local authority to choose a plan according to
local needs, and it became possible for a community to provide only
door-to-door "special services" for the handicapped rather than to
make mainline transportation modes accessible.
36
On April 28, 1976, however, President Ford issued an Executive
Order that gave the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) 37 the responsibility to "coordinate the implementation of sec-
tion 504 . . .by all federal departments and agencies . . . " and to
"establish guidelines for determining what are discriminatory practices,
within the meaning of section 504."38 The order also directed agencies
administering programs providing federal financial assistance to issue
the focus of the lawsuits changed to determining whether DOT's refusal to require access to
each bus was reasonable given the state of technology, and whether transit systems were
living up to the programming and implementation requirements of DOT's regulations. See
Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863, 866 (2d Cir. 1977), in which the court of appeals reversed a
district court holding that § 504 did not create a private right of action on plaintiffs behalf.
The court remanded the case to the district court to consider whether the defendants were
complying with the regulation's "special efforts" requirements. See also Vanko v. Finley,
440 F. Supp. 656, 666 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Bartel v. Biernat, 427 F. Supp. 226, 233 (E.D. Wis.
1977); Young v. Coleman, Civ. No. 4-76-201 (D. Conn. Dec. 17, 1976).
33. See 41 Fed. Reg. 18,234 (1976).
34. See 46 Fed. Reg. 17,488 (1981). "Special efforts" continues to be defined in the
Code of Federal Regulations as "genuine good faith progress in planning services for wheel-
chair users and semi-ambulatory handicapped persons, . . .that is reasonable by compari-
son with the service provided to the general public and that meets a significant fraction of
the transportation needs of such persons during a reasonable time period." Id.
35. 41 Fed. Reg. 18,234 (1976).
36. Id.
37. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) is now referred to as
the Department of Health and Human Services. 20 U.S.C. § 3508(a) (Supp. IV 1980). This
Comment will use the former designation.
38. Exec. Order No. 11,914, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (1976) (revoked by Exec. Order No.
12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (1980) giving implementation power to the Attorney General).
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regulations consistent with the standards established by the Secretary
of HEW.
39
HEW issued its guidelines in 1978.40 Based upon its analysis of
the statute, it concluded that section 504 mandated full accessibility in
the most integrated setting appropriate to meet the needs of handi-
capped persons. 4 1 The regulations required that all recipients of fed-
eral funds "mainstream" handicapped persons, that is, integrate such
persons into the same programs available to others rather than treat
them as a separate group requiring "special" programs.42 With respect
to public transportation, the HEW guidelines required that each indi-
vidual mode of transportation be accessible to the handicapped and,
specifically, that new buses be accessible to wheelchair users.
43
In 1979, DOT followed these guidelines in promulgating its own
regulations for making mass transportation accessible to the handi-
capped.44 These regulations followed the bold "mainstreaming" initia-
tive of the HEW guidelines by requiring that transit systems receiving
federal funds make each mode of public transportation accessible to
the handicapped by May 31, 1982.45 "Extraordinarily expensive"
structural changes to, or replacement of, existing vehicles or facilities,
however, could be accomplished over periods of up to ten years.
46
Moreover, particularly costly structural changes to rail systems could
be waived under certain conditions. 47 The DOT regulations indicated
that a transportation mode was accessible when it could be used by a
handicapped person in a wheelchair.48 Buses purchased after July 2,
1979, were required to have wheelchair lifts and, at the end of ten
years, transit systems were obligated to have one-half of their peak-
hour bus service accessible to wheelchair users.
49
The 1979 DOT regulations replaced the "special efforts" require-
ments, 50 which emphasized separate transportation services for the
handicapped, with an innovative plan that met the needs of both hand-
39. Id. § 2.
40. See 45 C.F.R. § 85 (1981).
41. 43 Fed. Reg. 2,134 (1978).
42. See 45 C.F.R. § 85.51 (1981). In the guidelines' preamble, program accessibility
was defined as "the concept of prohibiting the exclusion of handicapped persons from pro-
grams by virtue of architectural barriers to such facilities as buildings, vehicles, and walks,
while not requiring that existing facilities be completely barrier-free." 43 Fed. Reg. 2,135
(1978).
43. 45 C.F.R. §§ 85.57(b), 85.58 (1978).
44. See, eg., 44 Fed. Reg. 31,442, 31,448-49 (1979).
45. 49 C.F.R. § 27.83(a)-27.95 (1980).
46. Id. § 27.85.
47. Id. § 27.99.
48. Id. § 27.85.
49. Id.
50. See supra note 34 & accompanying text.
icapped and nonhandicapped members of the traveling public in an
integrated, equal setting. Under the guidelines, "separate treatment"
could be provided "only where necessary to ensure equal opportunities
and truly effective benefits and services."' 5' Transit authorities were ob-
ligated under the 1979 DOT regulations to make mass transportation
accessible to all persons, including the handicapped. This process




American Public Transit Association v. Lewis
In American Public Transit Association v. Lewis,53 a voluntary
trade association and eleven of its transit system members appealed a
lower court decision 54 that upheld the validity of the 1979 DOT regula-
tions. Plaintiffs in the district court argued that these regulations were
in excess of authority as stated under section 504, section 16 of the
UMTA, and section 165(b) of the FAHA.5 5 They also contended that
the regulations were procedurally defective because DOT had not con-
sidered all relevant issues, options, and comments during the rulemak-
ing process, and that the decision to issue the regulations was arbitrary
and capricious.
56
In granting the government's motion for summary judgment, the
district court found that the DOT regulations were a valid exercise of
the Transportation Secretary's authority to establish grant conditions
for programs receiving federal financial assistance. 57 The district court
further ruled that these statutes imposed upon the Secretary an affirma-
tive obligation to provide mass transportation services for the handi-
capped.58 The court noted that a variety of practical factors, including
the changing nature of available technology and the heterogeneous na-
ture of the handicapped community had prompted Congress to entrust
to the Secretary the choice of means for providing those services.
59
The court expressly rejected the defendants' argument that these
51. 45 C.F.R. § 85.51(b)(iv) (1981).
52. See supra notes 4, 20-21 & accompanying text.
53. 655 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
54. American Pub. Transit Ass'n v. Goldschmidt, 485 F. Supp. 811 (D.D.C. 1980).
55. Id. at 821.
56. Id. Petitioners also alleged below that the DOT regulations that were intended to
increase accessibility of the handicapped to mass transportation constituted "major federal
action" and were violative of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4361 (1976), because DOT had not prepared an environmental impact statement.
485 F. Supp. at 821.
57. 485 F. Supp. at 823.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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statutes required a "local options" approach.60 Although the court
concluded that section 504 formed part of the basis for the Secretary's
authority, it predicated its holding in large part upon the transportation
statutes relied upon by DOT.61
The district court also rejected the argument advanced by plain-
tiffs that the DOT regulations had been adopted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner.62 Instead, it concluded that DOT had carefully con-
sidered a number of alternatives to the mainline accessibility approach
embodied in the HEW guidelines and that, in adopting the regulations,
the Department had reasonably concluded that the approach to be im-
plemented was technologically feasible.6 3
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the
district court decision on the ground that, although section 504 bans
discrimination, it does not require a transit authority to make "burden-
some modifications" to its existing facilities in order to accommodate
the handicapped.64 The court ruled that section 504 does not give au-
thority to the Secretary to mandate full accessibility of transportation
modes to the handicapped, but it reserved judgment on the scope and
authority of the UMTA and FAHA.6 5 It remanded the case to the dis-
trict court for a finding on these issues. 66
In reaching its decision regarding the scope of section 504, the ap-
pellate court sought to apply the rationale used by the United States
Supreme Court in Southeastern Community College v. Davis,67 a deci-
sion that also interpreted section 504. The Southeastern decision, how-
ever, is inapposite and misleading in the Lewis context.
Southeastern Community College v. Davis
The plaintiff in Southeastern, a deaf student, applied for admission
to Southeastern Community College's nursing program. On the basis
of an examination of the plaintiff by an audiologist, her application was
denied on the ground that, even with a hearing aid, she would be un-
able to participate fully in the wide range of the program's activities.68
In a suit charging violation of section 504, the district court held that
60. Id. at 824-25.
61. Id. at 823.
62. Id. at 824-25.
63. Id.
64. 655 F.2d 1272, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
65. Id. at 1280.
66. ld. The court ordered a determination by the DOT of the validity of the regula-
tions under other statutes because it concluded that a reviewing court may not presume that
an administrator would have made the same decision on other grounds. Id at 1278 (citing
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947)).
67. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
68. Id. at 400-01.
plaintiff was not an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual"
within the meaning of the statute because she was unable to function
"sufficiently" in the program in spite of her handicap. 69 The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, although not disputing the district
court's finding of fact, ruled that the lower court had misconstrued sec-
tion 504 and, in light of new regulations promulgated after the lower
court's decision, concluded that Southeastern College had to consider
plaintiff's application for admission without regard to her hearing
disability.
70
In reviewing the school's actions, the Supreme Court held that, in
making admissions decisions, the school could consider physical quali-
fications necessary for the safe and successful completion of its nursing
program.71 The Court stated that an "otherwise qualified person"
under section 504 means a person able to meet all the requirements of a
program despite possessing a handicap.
72
The Court concluded that, under section 504, a program need not
take substantial affirmative action to remove barriers for the handi-
capped.73 This ruling, however, was notably qualified. It did not elim-
inate the possibility that program modifications would, in some
instances, be required in order to comply with the nondiscrimination
mandate of section 504.74 The Court emphasized that reliance upon
past practices and failure to remove barriers that unnecessarily impede
the handicapped could, in some instances, be regarded as discrimina-
tion against qualified handicapped individuals.75 The Court, however,
upheld the school's right to deny the plaintiffs application based on the
particular facts involved.
76
69. 424 F. Supp. 1341, 1345 (E.D.N.C. 1976). Under § 504, an "otherwise qualified"
handicapped person could not be excluded solely by reason of a handicap. See supra notes
29-30 & accompanying text.
70. 574 F.2d 1158, 1161 (4th Cir. 1978).
71. 442 U.S. at 405-07.
72. Id. at 406.
73. Id. at 410-12. The Supreme Court reserved judgment on whether the statute cre-
ated a private right of action. Id. at 404 n.5.
74. See id. at 412-13.
75. The Court carefully noted: "We do not suggest that the line between a lawful re-
fusal to extend affirmative action and illegal discrimination against handicapped persons
always will be clear. It is possible to envision situations where an insistence on continuing
past requirements and practices might arbitrarily deprive genuinely qualified handicapped
persons of the opportunity to participate in a covered program. Technological advances can
be expected to enhance opportunities to rehabilitate the handicapped. . . without imposing
undue financial and administrative burdens upon a State. Thus, situations may arise where a
refusal to modify an existing program might become unreasonable and discriminatory. Identi-
fication of those instances where a refusal to accommodate the needs of a disabled person
amounts to discrimination against the handicapped continues to be an important responsi-
bility of HEW." Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 414.
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The Southeastern decision did not establish a sweeping prohibition
against requiring program modification as a condition to receipt of fed-
eral funds. On the contrary, the Court held only that "substantial ad-
justments in existing programs beyond those necessary to eliminate
discrimination against otherwise qual4fed individuals" were not required
by section 504.77 The Court suggested that imposition of "undue
financial and administrative burdens" upon a state might dictate
against requiring certain kinds of program modifications. 78 Nonethe-
less, this language implicitly recognizes that certain programmatic ad-
justments might be necessary to avoid discrimination against the
handicapped.
79
Southeastern established a flexible standard for determining when
modifications are required. This standard requires that modifications
be made where necessary to accommodate qualified handicapped per-
sons. It applies not only to determining the extent of affirmative action
required, but also to determining which areas of human activity require
programmatic adjustments to accommodate "otherwise qualified"
handicapped persons. The Court, in referring to situations in which a
lawful refusal to modify a program might be unreasonable and unlaw-
ful, recognizes that varying degrees of program modification may be
required in different contexts.80 Thus, the Court emphasized that the
scope of section 504, though limited, was flexible enough to require a
greater or lesser degree of affirmative action based on "technological
advances" and practical considerations in a particular field.8 For this
reason, the result reached by the Supreme Court in the context of edu-
cation is not necessarily defensible in the transportation arena.8 2 The
"undue burdens" that the Court sought to restrict in the educational
context in Southeastern are not necessarily relevant when considering
mass transportation programs. As Judge Edwards noted in Lewis, "in
considering the accessibility of public transportation to otherwise quali-
fied handicapped persons, it is much more difficult to avoid 'discrimi-
77. Id. at 410 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 412.
79. Id. at 412-13.
80. Id. See supra note 75.
81. 442 U.S. at 412-13.
82. In his concurring opinion in Lewis, Judge Edwards noted: "I express no opinion
here on the extremely complicated question of whether the regulations exceed the permissi-
ble scope of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by imposing on transit authorities a re-
quirement of 'affirmative action' as opposed to one of 'non-discrimination.' In my opinion,
the application of section 304 to public transportation systems raises some questions that are
signycantly djiierentfrom those considered by the Supreme Court in the higher education set-
ting in Southeastern Community College v. Davis." However, the judge agreed with the ma-
jority that the case should be remanded so that DOT could clarify its proper statutory
authority for the regulations. 655 F.2d 1272, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1981). (Edwards, J., concur-
ring) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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nation' without taking some kind of 'affirmative action.' ",83
Southeastern also can be distinguished from Lewis on its facts. In
Southeastern, the plaintiff required immediate hearing aid assistance
and special attention from instructors in order to complete the nursing
program offered by the school.84 The plaintiff essentially was unable to
take part in the clinical phase of the nursing program because of her
hearing disability and would not have received even a rough equivalent
of the normal training. The Court found that a fundamental alteration
such as that required to enable the plaintiff to participate in the pro-
gram was more than the "modification" the regulation required.
85 It
noted:
lOin the present record it appears unlikely respondent could benefit
from any affirmative action that the regulation reasonably could be
interpreted as requiring . . . . [T]he record indicates that nothing
less than close, individual attention by a nursing instructor would be
sufficient to ensure patient safety if respondent took part in the
clinical phase of the nursing program. . . . In light of respondent's
inability to function in clinical courses without close supervision,
Southeastern, with prudence, could allow her to take only academic
classes. Whatever benefits respondent might realize from such a
course of study, she would not receive even a rough equivalent of the
training a nursing program normally gives.
86
Contrary to the necessity of immediate modification in Southeast-
ern, the regulations at issue in Lewis required local transit authorities
to make modifications in their systems, but allowed up to ten years to
meet the requirements.8 7 In addition, the regulations included excep-
tions such as a special waiver that allowed rail transit systems to plan
an alternative method of service in conjunction with handicapped
consultants.
88
The modification required by the regulations at issue in Lewis did
not amount to a fundamental alteration in the nature of a mass transit
system. The regulations did not, for example, require changes in
scheduling or in the number of buses or trains in the system, nor did
they interfere with day-to-day management of a system. They merely
required the implementation, over a long period of time, of available
devices allowing wheelchair access to public transit vehicles. Such de-
83. Id.
84. 442 U.S. at 408-09.
85. Id. at 409-10.
86. Id.
87. 44 Fed. Reg. 31,442, 31,477-79 (1979); 49 C.F.R. §§ 27.83-27.95 (1980).
88. 44 Fed. Reg. at 31,480; 49 C.F.R. § 27.99. In Lewis, the district court found in the
record that the DOT had a reasonable basis for believing that feasible wheelchair-lifts were
either currently available or would be available by the time any new buses were ready for
delivery. The district court also found "substantial" evidence concerning the feasibility of
accessible rail systems. 428 F. Supp. 811, 829 (D.D.C. 1980).
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vices are necessary to enable an otherwise qualified group of citizens to
make use of the system.
Dopico V. Goldschmidt
This distinction was recognized in a recent Second Circuit deci-
sion, Dopico v. Goldschmidt.8 9 In this action, plaintiffs, individually
and as representatives of all wheelchair-bound persons in New York
City, initiated two consolidated class actions in the district court seek-
ing declaratory and injunctive relief.90 The principal local defendants
were the New York City Transit Authority, the Metropolitan Transpor-
tation Authority, and the New York City Department of Transporta-
tion. The federal defendants were officials of the United States
Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Urban Mass Transpor-
tation Administration.91
Plaintiffs claimed that the local defendants, recipients of federal
mass transit assistance funds, failed to provide wheelchair users with
accessible mass transportation.92 Plaintiffs also contended that the fed-
eral defendants approved transit grants to the local defendants al-
though they knew or should have known that those defendants had
failed to make satisfactory "special efforts" as required by the statute.
93
The district court granted the local defendants' motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted and also
entered summary judgment in favor of the federal defendants.
94 It
ruled that section 16 of the UMTA does not create a private right of
action when considered in light of the United States Supreme Court
decision in Cori v. Ash, 95 and plaintiffs conceded that section 165(b) of
the FAHA did not create a private right of action in their favor.
96
89. 518 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd in part, 687 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1982).
90. 518 F. Supp. at 1165.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1165-66.
93. Id. at 11"66. See supra note 34.
94. 518 F. Supp. at 1190.
95. Id. at 1171-74. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Supreme Court found sev-
eral factors relevant in determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not
expressly providing one. "First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose special benefit the
statute was enacted'... that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plain-
tiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create
a remedy or to deny one? ... Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?. ... And, finally, is the cause of
action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the states,
so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?" Id.
at 78.
96. 518 F. Supp. at 1174 n.49. The court also ruled that § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), did not authorize suit for violation of these statutory provisions
because neither § 16 of the UMTA nor § 165(b) of the FAHA created substantive rights
enforceable under § 1983. Id. at 1176-78. The court also held that plaintiff had not stated a
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The district court further ruled that section 504 was limited and
thus could not be used to authorize the kind of "massive relief' that
plaintiffs sought in this action.97 The court analogized plaintiffs' re-
quest with the "kind of burdensome modifications" that the Southeast-
ern court held to be beyond the scope of section 504.98 The district
court cited the Lewis decision with approval in reaching its
conclusion. 99
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's ruling in regard to section 16 of the UMTA, section 165(b) of
the FAHA, and the constitutional issues.100 However, it reversed the
district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claim under section 504 and the
summary judgment granted in favor of the federal defendants. The
court ruled that even if plaintiffs' prayer for relief could be character-
ized as excessive under the 1979 DOT mainstreaming regulations, the
district court still had inherent power to fashion less ambitious interme-
diate relief if a violation of section 504 was found.101 The court distin-
guished Southeastern by noting that in that action, nothing short of
fundamental modifications would have accomplished plaintiffs admis-
sion to the defendant's nursing program, whereas in the present action,
a wide range of prospective relief was available to meet at least some of
plaintiffs' concerns if they proved their allegations. 10 2 Therefore, even
if plaintiffs' prayer for relief could be deemed to exceed the mandate of
section 504, more modest relief within the limits of Southeastern was
still available.10 3 Moreover, the court noted that plaintiffs also had al-
leged violations of the 1976 "special efforts" regulations, which, though
superfluous after the later amendments, were never officially with-
drawn by DOT and remained in effect as possible support for plaintiffs'
valid equal protection claim because defendants' actions were rational and not arbitrary or
capricious. Id. at 1178-79.
97. Id. at 1175-76.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1175.
100. 687 F.2d at 648-49.
101. Id. at 650.
102. Id.
103. Id. The court in Dopico also distinguished the recent decision of Board of Educ. v.
Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982), in which the United States Supreme Court ruled that the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA), 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976), did not
require a local school district to provide a sign-language interpreter for a deaf child already
receiving sufficient educational benefits. The Court held that the EAHCA was not struc-
tured like § 504 and so could not impair that section's authority to require some degree of
"positive effort" to expand availability of federally funded programs to otherwise qualified
handicapped persons. 687 F.2d at 643 n.6. Moreover, the Dopico court indicated that in
Rowley, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the specific relief that had been
ordered exceeded the educational benefit already being provided to the plaintiff whereas, in
this action, the plaintiffs had not yet been heard on the issue of whether the statutory re-
quirements of § 504 have been met. Id.
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The court of appeals also noted that use of the term "affirmative
action" as used by the United States Supreme Court in Southeastern
was particularly misleading in the transportation context. Dopico did
not involve a challenged program that had set goals for the hiring or
enrollment of compensatory numbers of a disadvantaged class.
05 In-
stead, the issue in that action involved a public service that plaintiffs
were entitled to use but that was not practically available to them.
Moreover, the court emphasized in this regard that the action was free
of the question of reverse discrimination and the associated problem of
changes in selection criteria necessary to widen the pool of qualified
applicants.10 6 Thus, it concluded that the issue involved was purely
economic and administrative, and that the primary consideration was
one of practicality rather than entitlement, merit or restitution.
10 7
The Dopico decision supports the view that section 504 by itself,
and in conjunction with other statutes, can be used to require local
transit authorities to make reasonable modifications to their systems in
order to accommodate qualified handicapped persons. The court's
conclusion that practicality rather than entitlement is the primary con-
sideration in deciding cases of accessible transportation suggests that
reasonable modifications within the Southeastern guidelines could
practically include accessibility options on mainline transit systems
similar to those established by the 1979 DOT regulations. In fact, such
accessibility options on mainline systems are less "burdensome" than
the immediate modifications that were required in Southeastern be-
cause of the extent of available federal funding for mass transportation.
No such funds were available to Southeastern at the time respondent
sought admission to its nursing program. 08
Factors of Costs and Federal Funding
The Southeastern Court noted that the amended provisions of sec-
tion 504 recognized that on occasion the elimination of discrimination
might involve some costs, and therefore authorized grants to the states.
However, no such grants were available to Southeastern to defray the
costs of program modification.'0 9 The Court nevertheless explicitly
recognized that "in some future case" the availability of funds to re-
104. The 1976 "special efforts" regulations remained in the Code of Federal Regulations
throughout the brief life of the 1979 regulations. See 46 Fed. Reg. 17,488 (1981). See also
supra note 34. The court of appeals therefore concluded that they were superseded only in
the sense of being rendered superfluous but were never voided. 687 F.2d at 650-51.
105. 687 F.2d at 652.
106. Id. at 653.
107. Id.
108. 442 U.S. at 411 n.10.
109. Id.
move barriers that unnecessarily impede the handicapped would be an
appropriate factor to consider when determining the existence of un-
lawful discrimination. 10 In Lewis, the court stressed the costs of the
required modifications but neglected to examine the availability of fed-
eral funding for such modifications. In fact, extensive funding was
available in the form of grants authorized by several statutory
sources" I and such funding was conditioned on compliance with the
requirements of section 504.'12 The legislative history of the transpor-
tation statutes and of section 504, coupled with the amount of federal
funding available for mass transit systems, leads to the conclusion that
Congress intended to impose mainstreaming as a condition to receipt of
such funds.
The subject of conditional grants was discussed by the Supreme
Court recently in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman. 113
In Pennhurst, the respondent, a retarded resident of Pennhurst State
110. Id.
111. Federal financial assistance for mass transportation programs comes from three
statutory sources. The first is the "discretionary capital grant" program administered by
DOT under § 3 of the UMTA, 49 U.S.C. § 1602. Under that program, the Secretary is
authorized to approve applications by states or local bodies for discretionary grants "on such
terms and conditions as he may prescribe" for the construction of mass transportation facili-
ties and for the purchase of rolling stock, including buses. Id. § 1602(a)(1). Under that
program, DOT pays for 80% of the project's costs. Id. § 1603(a). The discretionary capital
grant program constitutes a major source of funds for public transit programs. In a 1978
amendment to the UMTA, Pub. L. No. 599 § 303, 92 Stat. 2737, 2737-38 (1978) (codified at
49 U.S.C. § 1603(c)(3)(A)), Congress authorized appropriations for over $1.3 billion for
fiscal year 1979 for the capital grants authorized by § 3. Authorizations increase for future
years and currently extend through fiscal year 1982. Of the amounts authorized in fiscal
year 1979, Congress appropriated over $1.2 billion. Pub. L. No. 75-335, 92 Stat. 443 (1978).
The second major statutory source of funds for mass transit programs is found in § 5 of
the UMTA, 49 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976), the "formula grant" program. Section 5 authorizes the
Secretary "on such terms and conditions as he may prescribe" to approve applications for
grants based on a statutory formula for the purchase of buses and other capital expenses and
to assist mass transportation systems to pay operating expenses. Id § 1604(d)(1). Under
this program, DOT's share of an operating assistance grant is a maximum of 50%. Id
§ 1604(e). As with the discretionary grant program, the Department's share of a grant for
buses or other capital facilities is 80%. In the formula grant program, Congress authorized
appropriations of over $1.5 billion for fiscal 1979. Id. § 1604. The amount of funds each
urbanized area is eligible to receive varies according to such factors as population and popu-
lation density.
Finally, under the interstate substitution program authorized by the Federal-Aid High-
way Act, 23 U.S.C. § 103(e)(4) (1976), the Secretary is authorized to use federal highway
funds for mass transportation program grants. At a state's request, federal funds that would
otherwise be available for interstate highways may instead be used, with DOT's approval,
for the construction of public mass transit projects. Id. § 142(a), (b).
112. See supra notes 20 & 26.
113. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1978), affd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd,
451 U.S. 1 (1981), decree modjed on remand, 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 102
S. Ct. 2956 (1982).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34
November 1982] MASS TRANSPORTATION AND THE HANDICAPPED 507
School, brought a class action suit in federal district court on behalf of
herself and all other Pennhurst residents against that institution and
various officials responsible for its operation. Respondent alleged that
conditions at the institution were unsanitary, inhumane, and danger-
ous, and that the institution denied the class members equal protection
under the law. 1 14 Suit was brought under the eighth and fourteenth
amendments of the United States Constitution, section 504, the Devel-
opmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975,115 and
the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of
1966.116 The district court held that the mentally retarded have a con-
stitutional right to be provided with "minimally adequate habilitation"
in the "least restrictive environment." 17 The court held that both sec-
tion 504 and the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation
Act of 1966 also provided such a right."l8
Although the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
lower court order, it avoided the constitutional questions raised. The
court premised its ruling on the Developmentally Disabled Assistance
and Bill of Rights Act, which the court found created an implied right
of action on behalf of mentally retarded persons." 9 The Supreme
Court reversed, stating that there was "nothing in the Act or its legisla-
tive history to suggest that Congress intended to require [sjtates to as-
sume the high cost of providing 'appropriate treatment' in the 'least
restrictive environment' to their mentally retarded citizens." 20 Instead,
the Court concluded that the Act's language and structure demon-
strated that it was a voluntary federal-state funding statute and rejected
the argument that its provisions were made compulsory pursuant to
Congress' power to enact legislation under the spending power' 2 ' or the
fourteenth amendment. 122
114. 451 U.S. at 6.
115. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1976).
116. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50 §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1966).
117. 446 F. Supp. at 1314-20.
118. Id. at 1322-24. The district court also held that respondent's constitutional right
under the eighth amendment "to be free from harm" had been violated and that respondent
was also entitled to be provided with "non-discriminatory habilitation" under the equal
protection clause. Id. at 1320-22.
119. 612 F.2d 84, 107 (3d Cir. 1979).
120. 451 U.S. at 18.
121. Id. at 17-19. The spending power incorporated in article I, section 8, clause 1, of
the Constitution provides: "Congress shall have power to... provide for the ... general
welfare of the United States." The Supreme Court recognizes Congress' power to fix the
terms and conditions on which it grants federal money to the states. See, e.g., Rosado v.
Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Oklahoma v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
122. 451 U.S. at 18. Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment provides that "Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." For
decisions on Congress' power to secure the guarantees of this amendment, see Fitzpatrick v.
The Court stated that, under the rule of statutory construction,
"Congress must clearly express its intent to impose conditions on the
grant of federal funds so that the states can knowingly decide whether
or not to accept those funds."'123 This rule is particularly applicable in
cases where the states' potential obligation is undetermined. 124 There-
fore, if Congress does not clearly impose conditions on the states' re-
ceipt of federal funds, states have no obligation to fund the federally
mandated policies. 25
The Court also noted that the relatively small amount of federal
aid that was appropriated to Pennsylvania in this instance indicated
that Congress had not intended to create substantive rights for individ-
uals covered by the Act. 126 In fact, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, the official responsible for administering the Act, admitted
that he had no authority to withhold funds from states that failed to
meet the provisions of the Act. 127 The Court ruled that this was con-
clusive that Congress did not intend that the provisions of the Act be
mandatory.
128
It is clear, however, that Congress did intend the provisions of sec-
tion 504, in the context of mass transportation, to be mandatory. Con-
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641 (1966).
123. 451 U.S. at 24.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 17. The Court made brief reference to its holding in Southeastern and noted:
"The Court below failed to recognize the well-settled distinction between Congressional 'en-
couragement' of state programs and the imposition of binding obligations on the states
I.... Relying on that distinction, this court in Southeastern Community College v. Davis
...rejected a claim that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which bars discrimi-
nation against handicapped persons in federally funded programs, obligated schools to take
affirmative steps to eliminate problems raised by an applicant's hearing disability. Finding
that 'state agencies such as Southeastern are only encourage[d] . . . to adopt such policies
and procedures, . . .' we stressed that Congress understood that accommodations of the
needs of handicapped individuals may require affirmative action and knew how to provide
for it in those instances where it wished to do so." Id. at 27. See supra notes 75, 82 &
accompanying text.
126. 451 U.S. at 24: "The fact that Congress granted to Pennsylvania only $1.6 million
in 1976, a sum woefully inadequate to meet the enormous financial burden of providing
Iappropriate' treatment in the 'least restrictive' setting, confirms that Congress must have
had a limited purpose in enacting section 6010. When Congress does impose affirmative
obligations on the states, it usually makes a far more substantial contribution to defray the
costs."
127. Id.
128. Id. On remand, the court of appeals held that Pennsylvania's Mental Health and
Mental Retardation Act provided adequate support, independent of federal law, for the fed-
eral court's order enjoining institutionalization of mentally retarded citzens. 673 F.2d at
656. The court also held that the eleventh amendment did not bar the federal court from
entering its order enjoining institutionalization of mentally retarded citizens. Id. at 659, cert.
granted, 102 S. Ct. 2956 (1982).
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gress has strongly indicated that mass transportation accessible to a
wide cross-section of the population is a national priority. 29 This con-
cern is reflected in statements by members of Congress 30 and in the
extent of federal funding for accessible mass transit systems which, in
some instances, covers up to eighty percent of capital costs. 131
The conditional terms under which states receive federal transpor-
tation funds and the authority granted to the Secretary of Transporta-
tion to condition grants 32 on local compliance with section 504 and
other statutes support the view that Congress clearly expressed its in-
tent that mass transportation be made accessible and that states that
accept federal funding knowingly undertake their share of that obliga-
tion. 133 Congressional policy in this area, therefore, cannot be viewed
as "only wishful thinking on the part of Congress or as some fanciful
role in the implementation"' 34 of accessible mass transportation.
It is also clear that Congress understood the provisions of section
504 to require mainstreaming in mass transportation. The legislative
history and the language of section 504 reflect a belief that the isolation
of handicapped persons from mainstream society stems from discrimi-
nation. 35 In addition, subsequent legislation indicates a congressional
understanding that, at least with respect to mass transit, mainstreaming
is required to end discrimination.136
In Southeastern, plaintiffs introduced into evidence the statements
of certain members of Congress indicating that they viewed section 504
as requiring affirmative efforts.137 The Court found that these state-
ments, made after the passage of section 504, did not constitute valid
evidence of congressional intent and noted: "Nor do these comments,
none of which represents the will of Congress as a whole, constitute
subsequent 'legislation' such as this court might weigh in construing the
meaning of an earlier enactment."' 38
129. See 49 U.S.C. § 1612 (1970). See also supra text accompanying note 18.
130. See supra note 21.
131. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1976). See supra note 111.
132. The Secretary is authorized to approve applications by states or local bodies for
grants "on such terms and conditions as he may prescribe. " 49 U.S.C. § 1602(a)(1) (1976)
(emphasis added). See supra notes 20 & 111.
133. See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 24. See also Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034,
3049-50 n.26 (1982). The legislative history of the EAHCA, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976), indi-
cates that Congress did not intend to impose conditional requirements on the states. See
supra note 105.
134. 451 U.S. at 40. (White, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ. dissenting). The dissenters in
Pennhurst argued that Congress intended state compliance with § 6010 to be a precondition
of receipt of federal funds. Id
135. See supra notes 30 & 32.
136. See supra notes 20 & 26.
137. 442U.S. at411-12n.ll.
138. Id.
In Lewis, however, there was valid evidence of congressional in-
tent. Section 504 was passed in 1973. In 1975, Congress amended the
FAHA to require that mass transit projects funded with federal high-
way funds be constructed and operated to allow effective utilization by
handicapped persons. 39 In addition, when appropriating the UMTA
budget for 1975, Congress attached a rider to the bill emphasizing that
all funds had to be used to design and purchase accessible means of
transportation.1 40 These amendments constitute the type of subsequent
legislation referred to in Southeastern and demonstrate Congress' un-
derstanding of the actions necessary to eliminate discrimination against
the handicapped in the area of mass transportation.
In addition to the amendments to the UMTA and the FAHA,
Congress demonstrated its intent to require "mainstreaming" each time
after 1978 that it appropriated money under those statutes and condi-
tioned grants of such money on compliance with section 504.141 Once
HEW had issued regulations mandating mainstreaming, the continued
conditioning of money upon compliance with section 504 can be
viewed as an indication of Congress' understanding that such main-
streaming was required by the section. Thus, congressional intent that
handicapped persons be mainstreamed into mass transit systems was
well demonstrated before the implementation of the 1979 DOT
regulations.
Moreover, although the Supreme Court in Southeastern held that
"substantial adjustments in existing programs beyond those necessary
to eliminate discrimination against otherwise qualified individuals"
were not required by section 504,142 it is doubtful whether mainstream-
ing in the area of mass transportation could be accomplished without
modifications such as those required by the 1979 DOT regulations.
Once the idea of separate transportation facilities for otherwise quali-
fied handicapped persons is rejected as inherently discriminatory, mak-
ing existing systems accessible to all individuals is the only viable way
to prevent the discrimination forbidden by section 504.
The Court in Southeastern suggested that the imposition of "un-
due financial and administrative burdens" upon a state may dictate
against requiring certain kinds of program modifications. 143 The Lewis
court found that such burdens were imposed by the 1979 DOT regula-
tions. 44 However, the court failed to consider that the financial bur-
139. Federal-Aid Highway Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-643, § 105, 88 Stat.
2281, 2282-83 (1975) (codified at 23 U.S.C. § 142 (1976)). See supra note 26.
140. See supra note 20.
141. The terms for congressional funding of accessible mass transportation remained
unchanged after passage of the mainstreaming requirements. See supra note 111.
142. 442 U.S. at 410.
143. Id. at 412.
144. 655 F.2d at 1278.
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dens were alleviated by federal funding, a factor not present in
Southeastern.14 5 In addition, the court could point to no fundamental
alteration of the nature of the program such as would create adminis-
trative burdens. It is because of the court's failure to distinguish the
issues involved in Lewis from those raised in the context of education
that a mechanical application of the Southeastern analysis and an erro-
neous and inequitable result were inevitable.
Conclusion
Millions of individuals depend upon mass transportation for their
livelihood. It is central to the survival of trade and human interac-
tion.146 Practical considerations reflecting the national interest demand
that such an integral system be geared to accommodate the needs of
most, if not all, of the population. Such an approach has distinct eco-
nomic benefits since it encourages greater numbers of individuals to
become involved in the economic and social fabric of mainstream soci-
ety.t47 Moreover, this approach denounces the policy of separate ac-
commodations for the handicapped wherever feasible, 48 as well as the
stigma associated with such treatment. 149 The 1979 DOT regulations
mirrored congressional intent in this regard and their promulgation
was an important step in achieving these goals.
The Lewis decision, on the other hand, will have a debilitating
effect on efforts to make transportation modes accessible to the handi-
capped. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia failed to
define "undue financial and administrative burdens"'15 0 in the transpor-
tation area. The ambiguity involving such a central issue creates the
opportunity for conflicting interpretations at both the federal and local
levels and could be a springboard for further litigation on this issue.
In attempting to answer the different questions raised in the mass
transportation arena, the Lewis court applied an inflexible standard
that is unworkable and inappropriate in the transportation context.
145. See supra note 111 & accompanying text.
146. In 1977, buses carried 5.3 billion passengers in the United States. Subways, street-
cars, and commuter rail carried an additional 2.25 billion people. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 658 (1978).
147. See supra notes 4, 21, 30 & accompanying text.
148. The HEW guidelines which laid the foundation for the DOT regulations stated:
"[Sleparate or different treatment can be permitted only where necessary to ensure equal op-
portunity and truly effective beneits and services." 43 Fed. Reg. 2134 (emphasis added). See
supra note 26.
149. See Jones, Labels and Stigma in Special Education, 38 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN
553, 560-61 (1972) (very act of labeling a child as "disabled" and placing him or her in a
separate program has a stigmatizing effect and often produces an education of inferior
quality).
150. 655 F.2d at 1278. See supra notes 75 & 82.
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The decision is contrary to the intent of section 504 and other related
statutes and misapplies the Supreme Court's ruling in Southeastern.
The court failed to recognize that the nature of mass transportation
demands greater "affirmative efforts" in order to accommodate "other-
wise qualified" handicapped persons than are required in an area such
as education. Undue reliance on separate accommodations, rather
than mainstream transportation facilities for all qualified individuals, is
discriminatory and intolerable. Society can no longer allow separate
standards for different segments of its citizenry.1
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151. See Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualqcation of
Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 855 (1975). Congress now has before it for its review and consideration the
challenged DOT regulations. Both Houses of Congress have also proposed legislation to
permit alternate methods of satisfying § 504 and § 16 of the UMTA short of mainline acces-
sibility. See Federal Public Transportation Act of 1980, S. 2720, and Surface Transportation
Act of 1980, H.R. 6417, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. (1980). See 126 CONG. REC. 8150-57 (June 25,
1980). The framework of these legislative proposals, along with the reports and debates,
indicates Congress' recognition that, absent modifying legislation, the Secretary of Trans-
portation does have authority to ensure mass transportation services for the handicapped.
Therefore, the challenged DOT regulations constituted a legitimate exercise of the Secre-
tary's authority. The Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief has also included the
DOT regulations and the HEW guidelines in its list of regulations scheduled for review and
possible modification pursuant to Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981).
* Member, Third Year Class.
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